Despite extensive research interest in the last decade, the banking literature has not reached a consensus on the impact of bank mergers on deposit rates. In particular, results on the dynamics of deposit rates surrounding bank mergers vary substantially across studies. In this paper, we aim for a comprehensive empirical analysis of a bank merger's impact on deposit rate dynamics. We base the analysis on a unique dataset comprising deposit rates of 624 US banks with a monthly frequency for the time period [1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006]. These data are matched with individual bank and local market characteristics and the complete list of bank mergers in the US. The data allow us to track the dynamics of bank mergers while controlling for the rigidity of the deposit rates and for a range of merger, bank and local market features. An innovation of our work is the introduction of an econometric approach of estimating the change of the deposit rates given their rigidity.
Introduction
Bank mergers affect bank competition by altering the market structure in affected local bank markets and the size and geographical scope of the merging banks. The widespread bank consolidation in the US has been met with a growing literature on the impact of bank mergers on bank competition. A substantial portion of this literature concentrates on the impact of bank mergers on bank loan and deposit rates. Berger and Hannan (1989) were the first to show in a static framework that high market concentration results in lower deposit rates. In a later work, Hannan and Prager (1998) explicitly concentrate on bank mergers as a determinant of local bank market concentration and study the dynamics of deposit rates during the first year after a bank merger. They are able to document a negative impact of mergers on deposit rates. On the other hand, Focarelli and Panetta (2003) argue that the analysis of merger effects should embrace a longer time period after the merger. They posit that whereas the market power effect of a merger materializes within a very short time after the merger, potential efficiency gains can only be materialized with a delay. These authors extend the time horizon of the analysis to six years after the merger, and their results imply that in the long run, merging banks offer higher deposit rates than their rivals.
The seemingly contradicting results of these studies motivate us to revisit the topic. In this paper we present a comprehensive analysis of the impact of bank mergers on deposit rate dynamics. Our focus is, thereby, on the effect of the merger on the bank price-setting mechanism, rather than on its effect on efficiency and other performance measures.
We base our analysis on a new unique dataset comprising monthly deposit rate data of 624 banks in the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The deposit rate data are matched with bank and market characteristics and a complete list of bank mergers from 1988 to 2005.
Our detailed dataset allows us to address two important lacunae of the existing literature.
First, the empirical literature on deposit rate dynamics around bank mergers has so far ignored the rigidity of deposit rates. As documented in earlier studies (Hannan and Berger, 1991; and Neumark and Sharpe, 1992) deposit rates adjust sluggishly to changes in market interest rates.
Deposit rate rigidity is relevant for the analysis of the changes of deposit rates around bank mergers because no immediate change in deposit rates is observed for a significant number of observations. In addition to a possibly slow adjustment to the change in market structure, which must be modelled with a dynamic model, the data present the additional problem of rigidity: that is, for the vast majority of observations, the price is the same as for the period before. In econometric terms this censoring presents large potential problems. It has long been known that in the presence of censoring, OLS regression results can be inconsistent and biased (see a standard text such as Wooldridge, 2002) . We incorporate the rigidity of deposit rates in the empirical analysis by explicitly integrating the censoring process into the empirical estimation. Our focus is on modelling bank pricing behaviour by accounting for both the probability of a deposit rate change and the de facto change of the deposit rates in a joint framework. The design is structured to estimate bank merger's impact on the deposit rate setting mechanism.
Second, previous research on the impact of bank mergers has mostly concentrated on inmarket mergers. We argue that the distinction between in-and out-of-market mergers is not clear-cut since modern bank mergers might be classified as both in-and out-of-market depending on the perspective of the local market. We include all bank mergers (without ex ante imposing restrictions on the type of merger) together with a range of controls for the characteristics of the mergers. Thus, we are able to assess the impact of a wide range of bank mergers and how this impact may be modified by various features of the merger (bank size growth, market share growth, or rise in the number of markets). In other words, we estimate whether bank mergers exert negative impacts on depositors and if that is the case, which particular features of the merger reinforce the negative impact.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the existing literature. Section 3 illustrates the data. Section 4 presents replications of earlier research approaches using our new dataset. Section 5 presents our empirical approach and its results.
Section 6 makes some concluding remarks.
Literature
Our study aims to contribute to a broad empirical literature on the pricing effects of mergers.
Many studies exist on the impact of company mergers in various industries 1 , but because of better data availability, most of the research concentrates on the banking industry. Most of this literature on the impact of bank mergers focuses on testing the validity of two hypotheses, the "efficiency hypothesis" and its opposite, the "structure-conduct-performance hypothesis".
The "efficiency hypothesis" states that the merged bank might reach economies of scale and other efficiency gains and transfer these to the customers in the form of more beneficial interest rates. The most important assumption made by the proponents of the efficiency hypothesis is that efficiency gains are passed on to consumers rather than to other stakeholders. The "structure-conduct-performance hypothesis", on the other hand, states that the merged bank may exploit its increased market power and impose interest rates that are disadvantageous to consumers.
The seminal paper by Berger and Hannan (1989) , which emphasizes the structure-conductperformance hypothesis, is a static study of the relationship between local banking market concentration and deposit rates. Here, the authors find that more concentrated deposit markets 1 In a study that has inspired the early research on the effect of mergers Kim and Singal (1993) find out that airline merger have resulted in higher airfares. On the contrary, Connor et al (1997) find out that hospital mergers have resulted in more beneficial consumer prices.
are characterized by lower deposit rates 2 . The later work by Hannan and Prager (1998) focuses on bank mergers as a determinant of bank market concentration. The authors explore the dynamics of the deposit rate changes 3 and find that after a substantial in-market merger, the merging banks significantly decrease their deposit rates which they explain by an increase in market power. Focarelli and Panetta (2003) argue for the efficiency view, maintaining that the post-merger period examined in previous studies has been too short 4 . They consider a longer time period and posit that the effect of market power materializes instantaneously where efficiency gains need more time to materialize 5 . They present a more comprehensive study, which incorporates long-run post-merger dynamics and controls for bank size and asset risk with total assets and bad loans, and for the market. In their study, efficiency gains prevail. Whereas merging banks tend to decrease deposit rates in the transition period (up to three years after the merger), in the long-run, deposit rates of merged banks go up and beyond those of rival banks.
The studies mentioned above focus mostly on in-market mergers, occasionally using out-ofmarket mergers as a control for mergers which do not increase market power. A newer strand of the literature suggests that although out-of-market mergers do not directly affect the distribution of market shares, they can significantly impact bank pricing behavior. The theoretical foundation, as given by the models of Barros (1999) and Park and Pennacchi (forthcoming) , is based on the assumption that multimarket banks (which are a result of outof-market mergers) have access to more diverse sources of financing, whereas single-market 2 Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) replicate Berger and Hannan's (1989) analysis on a sample of EU banks.
3 Kahn et al (2005) study the dynamics of loan rates in a similar framework.
4 Sapienza (2002) studies loan rate dynamics in a similar framework. 5 Berger, Sounders, Scalise and Udell (1998) and Calomiris and Karceski (2000) argue that the "gestation" period needed to restructure a merged bank is three years.
banks depend largely on retail deposits 6 . As a result they argue that out-of-market mergers result in lower deposit rates. Park and Pennacchi (forthcoming) 7 and Hannan and Prager (2006) present empirical tests of this hypothesis, and both find that multimarket banks offer lower deposit rates than their single-market rivals. Using a separate dataset and estimation approach Rosen (2003) , however, finds different results. He argues that growing banks tend to offer higher interest rates on deposits, and moreover, a market with more and larger multimarket banks generally sees higher deposit rates at all banks.
The literature of multimarket banking is closely related to that strand which concentrates on the interaction between bank size and the way banks compete. In a seminal paper, Stein (2002) argues that large and small banks process information differently and that is why they compete differently in the loan market. Park and Pennacchi (forthcoming) extend this argument and argue that bank size is also important for deposit market competition.
The literature on multimarket banks is also related to an industrial organisation literature focusing on multiple contacts between firms as a factor facilitating collusion. Edwards (1955) points to the fact that when firms meet in numerous markets they may have higher incentives to collude because retaliation by the rivals may follow in numerous markets. This relation is known as the "linked oligopoly" hypothesis. Mester (1987) provides an empirical test of this hypothesis. She finds that, contrary to expectations, multiple market contacts lead to more competitive pricing, especially in concentrated markets.
In this paper we focus on the seemingly contradictory results with regard to deposit rate dynamics. One potential reason for the deviating results is that researchers have used different datasets. However, results might also be biased because of the inadequate treatment of deposit 6 The structure of bank liabilities has been the subject also of a growing literature on market discipline. It has argued that banks may not refinance in the wholesale market because wholesale exposures are not insured and create incentives for the lenders to monitor. Therefore, banks which are perceived as riskier may prefer to refinance mostly with insured retail deposits (Billett, et al, 1998) .
rate dynamics (in particular, the time series structure of deposit rates has been ignored).
Moreover, all existing studies include only a fraction of past mergers in the analysis. We add to the literature by performing a comprehensive analysis, which addresses both the dynamics of deposit rates and a broad range of features of bank mergers with a single dataset, allowing us to control for pre-and post-merger characteristics of the local markets.
Data
We base the empirical estimation on a unique dataset that is drawn from the full list of bank Therefore, as in Kahn et al (2005) we base our tests on rate changes computed over four-week intervals. Our sample encompasses a total of 461 weeks, which allows us to construct a time series of 115 four-week intervals, which we refer to as "months" although they do not correspond to calendar months. This approach also allows the comparison of our results with those of Hannan and Prager (1998) , which are also based on monthly frequency data.
Bankrate Monitor reports cover a comprehensive set of deposit products (checking accounts, money market deposit accounts and certificates of deposits with a maturity of three months to up to five years). In this paper we concentrate on checking account and money market deposit account (MMDA) rates only. We exclude the rates on certificates of deposit because they are investment products with a relatively high minimum denomination and we expect them to react less to changes in local market conditions. 8 As noted by Örs and Rice (2007) Bankrate Monitor reports deposit rates for "the lowest minimum deposit amount," which might be the "effectively lowest rates offered by banks and not the most-commonly cited rates". Although a downward bias in the Bankrate Monitor deposit rate data is possible, if this bias is persistent, it is unlikely to affect our results, since we concentrate on deposit rate changes around the merger rather than on deposit rate levels.
In addition, we enrich the dataset with a broad range of control variables for individual banks from the Quarterly Reports of Conditions and Income (call reports) . These are at a quarterly frequency. We also include control variables for the local markets. The source of the local market controls is the Summary of Deposits, and these data are available only at an annual frequency.
Mergers and deposit rate dynamics: a simple empirical framework
As pointed out in Section 2, previous studies have reached contradictory results on the impact of bank mergers on deposit rates. Results may differ because of different estimation approaches but also because researchers have employed different data sources. Hannan and Prager (1998) , for example, employ data from US bank mergers, whereas Focarelli and Panetta (2003) base their analysis on Italian data. In order to illustrate how sensitive the empirical results are to the changes of the model specification, we start the empirical analysis by replicating Hannan and Prager's and Focarelli and Panetta's estimation approaches with our dataset.
Our first exercise is to apply Hannan and Prager's (1998) estimation approach to our dataset.
For the sake of comparability, we concentrate in this section on substantial in-market mergers only 9 . As in Hannan and Prager (1998) , we estimate the following empirical model:
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The dependant variable,
, is the change in the log of the deposit rate (for checking accounts and money market deposit accounts) between t-1 and t. The 
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As illustrated in Table 1 for both the checking account and the MMDA rates, we are able to qualitatively replicate the results of Hannan and Prager (1998) . The time dummy for 13 to 26 weeks post-merger enters the checking account rate regression with a negative, statistically significant coefficient. All other "time-to-merger" dummies are statistically insignificant. In the case of money market deposit account rates, the pre-merger effect and the merger effect 13 to 26 weeks after the merger are negative and statistically significant, whereas the 27 to 39 weeks after the merger effect is positive. The cumulative effect is, however, negative. These results confirm the negative short-term effect of in-market mergers 11 on deposit rates and can be interpreted as evidence in support of the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. In Hannan and Prager's (1998) framework the change of deposit rates around a merger is studied without controlling for changes in the reference interest rates (T-bill rate or fed funds rate), which are important determinants of deposit rates. One potential approach to control for the reference rate is suggested by Focarelli and Panetta (2003) . Focarelli and Panetta (2003) examine the level of deposit rates relative to the reference rate rather than just the change of deposit rates 12 . Focarelli and Panetta also expand the analyzed time period after the merger and include a few controls on the bank and local market levels. The estimated model in this case is:
As in Focarelli and Panetta (2003) , the dependant variable
is the difference between the deposit rate (checking account rate or MMDA rate) and the fed funds rate. The time distance to the merger is measured by a set of five dummies (for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth year after the merger). Controls for bank characteristics are bank size (log of total assets) and bank size squared. On the local market level we control for market concentration using the Herfindahl index (HHI) and average per capita income in the local market (in log form). Note: The dependant variable is the difference between the deposit rate (money market rate or checking account rate) and the fed funds rate. Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
As shown by the results of the estimations of model (2) presented in Table 2 , we are able to qualitatively replicate Focarelli and Pannetta's (2003) results. Using Focarelli and Panetta's approach, we also document that bank mergers have a positive effect on deposit rates. Our results, however, differ from Focarrelli and Panetta's results, in that we do not document a negative short-term impact on deposit rates (that is, in the first two years after the merger).
The control variables enter the regression with coefficients of the expected sign, given a Focarelli and Panetta world. So, larger banks offer lower deposit rates, but the negative effect of bank size is exhausted at a certain threshold. The Herfindahl index has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that banks offer lower deposit rates in more concentrated local markets.
The results of this exercise differ substantially from those of Hannan and Prager's (1998 Hannan and Prager (1998) into a positive one even in the short run. When, in addition to adding control variables, we also change the dependent variable from the deposit rate change (as in Hannan and Prager) to the relative rate (as in Focarelli and Panetta) we find a negative merger effect if we examine only one year after the merger and a positive one if we examine a period of up to five years after the merger.
A comparison of the results illustrates that even when the same dataset is employed, empirical results change substantially depending on the choice of dependent variable, the time span and the set of control variables. This conclusion leads us to track the dynamics of deposit rate changes in a more comprehensive framework.
Bank mergers and the dynamics of deposit interest rates: an extended empirical analysis
The empirical tests presented in Section 4 do not consider the censoring issue arising from the rigidity of deposit rates. When we replicate Hannan and Prager's (1998) approach, we estimate a regression in which the dependent variable is the monthly change of deposit rates.
As illustrated in Table 3 , we observe no change in the deposit rate for a huge share of observations in our sample. On average, checking account rates stay unchanged in 90% of the months, whereas money market account rates do not change in more than 84% of the months. of the change in the fed funds rate during the periods: (t-1,t), (t-2, t-1) and (t-3, t-2).
Our model therefore estimates how the process of adjustment-of bank deposit rates to changes in the reference rate during the current and previous periods-is modified by bank mergers and the characteristics of the bank and the local bank market. Thus, when we discuss a negative or positive impact of a merger on deposit rates, we mean the impact of the merger on this process.
Estimation technique
As a benchmark, we first estimate the model by standard OLS. We then proceed with modelling the rigidity of the deposit rates to estimate the impact of bank mergers on deposit rates by a "trigger model" with fixed costs of the price (deposit rate) adjustment constructed in the tradition of the "Ss" literature. We assume that an underlying latent variable, itself a function of measured time series characteristics, must reach a positive or a negative trigger point before it can change the deposit rate in either direction. , then calculating the expectation of the observed deposit rate change is straightforward. The expectation, given the control variables, ijt X , and the fact that the observed change is not zero
which can be expressed
where φ and Φ are the standard normal density and cumulative normal density functions, respectively, and function values are expressed , , , 
and weights are
Although the likelihood functions for the system described above are well defined, maximum likelihood estimation procedures rarely converged because of the large numbers of parameters, combined with the huge number of observations. However, the form of the equation suggests a different approach based on the work of Heckman.
In the first step, we estimate on whether or not we observe price increases or decreases and compute
The intuition behind λ is that it represents the expectation of the error term due to the censoring process. By including an estimated value of λ as a right hand variable in a second stage, we ensure that the unobserved error term has an expectation that approaches zero in large samples, giving us consistent estimates of our parameters of interest, β .
The parameters β are estimated in the second step using simple GLS on the observations of the changes in the deposit rate that are nonzero:
where, again, λ is included as a regressor in the estimation of ijt deprate ln ∆ to correct for the censoring bias, yielding an unobserved error term with asymptotic expectation of zero.
Of course, the standard errors for the estimated parameters must be estimated in a way that accounts for the fact that an included regressor, ) , ( The empirical approach described above gives us a consistent estimate of the impact of mergers on deposit rates while accounting for interest rate rigidity. The estimates illustrate how mergers affect bank price setting and, in particular, how a bank reaction to a change in the reference rate is modified by a merger.
Explanatory variables

Variables measuring merger's impact across time
When defining the impact of a bank merger on deposit rates, we concentrate on two major issues, the evolution of the effect of a bank merger over time; and the question of how many of a given bank's previous mergers should be considered (numerous banks acquire multiple targets within a very short period). By concentrating exclusively on the last merger, we might omit important information about the evolution of bank merger effects.
To consider the evolution of a merger effect, we account for a period from one year before the merger date 15 to up to ten years after the merger. We approximate the development of deposit 
and where x is the value of the explanatory variable (the time distance to the merger, in our case). The values i x denote the "knots" of the spline, and the coefficients, i α , are estimated from the data. In our case, we approximate the impact of a merger on the change of the deposit rates by dividing the time period around the merger into several subperiods. We fix the knots, i x , at six months before the merger date, at the merger date, six months, one year, one and one-half years, two years, three years and four years after the merger. Through the splines we model the potential nonlinearity of the dependence between deposit rate changes and time after the merger.
To our knowledge, previous research on the impact of mergers on bank rates has used only dummies for different time windows around the merger. A disadvantage of the dummies is that they are a stepwise and discontinuous approximation of the merger effect across time.
Linear splines give a more precise approximation by modeling the effect of mergers as a set of continuous linear functions.
As a robustness check, we reran our regressions with dummies instead of splines; results did not change qualitatively. The results of these estimations are presented on the authors' web site.
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With regard to the history of banks that have experienced numerous mergers, we proceed as follows: to keep the model parsimonious, we define the splines for the time distance from the latest merger only. For previous mergers, we define a set of dummy variables, merger i , which takes the value of 1 if the bank has had at least i mergers and 0, otherwise. Our dataset contains up to six mergers for an individual bank. The variables merger 4, merger 5 , and merger 6 entered all regression specifications with statistically insignificant coefficients, so we dropped them from the analysis. We interpret the insignificance of the dummies for earlier mergers as a result of the fact that banks that have merged three times during our sample horizon tend to have merged numerous times and so are all similar in this regard.
Variables controlling for the type of merger
In our study, we include the full sample of bank mergers in the period 1988-2005. We do not divide mergers into in-market and out-of-market groups, because we think that this distinction is not clear cut. Most of the mergers in the US during the last few years have been between banks that were already operating in multiple markets. From one local market's point of view, a merger might appear as an in-market merger (if the local market is part of the overlapping geographical range of the two merging banks). In contrast, from the point of view of a local market in which only one of the merging banks has been operating, the merger appears as a market extension (out-of-market) merger. Based on these considerations, we include all mergers in the analysis, together with a range of merger characteristics as controls.
The existing literature has so far emphasized three important features of bank mergers, which might influence the pricing behavior of the merged bank, and we include these in our model.
The first is the change in market share. When two banks operating in the same market merge, their joint market share allows them to exercise market power and offer lower deposit rates.
We control for this effect by including in the regressions the change of market share (CMS)
caused by the merger. Because we do not have precise data on the change of market share directly related to the merger for each of the affected local markets, we have to approximate it with the change of market share realized in the year of the merger. That is, we approximate the change of market share caused by the merger as the difference between the bank's market share in the years before and after the merger 17 .
In order to estimate how the effect of the change of market share evolves in the time after the merger, we also introduce a cross-product of CMS and the time after the merger (CMS*time after merger=CMS*ln(1+ weeks after the merger)).
The second key aspect of mergers that has been emphasized in the literature is the change of bank size. Because banks grow in size when they merge, they might achieve efficiencies of scale. On the other hand, as Park and Pennacchi (forthcoming) point out, larger banks have access to more diversified sources of financing and might, therefore, keep deposit rates low.
To estimate the impact of the merged banks' size (target's size), we include the volume of total assets of the target bank 18 (normalized to the acquirer's total assets) in the regression.
The cross-product of the target's size and the time after the merger (TS*time after merger= target's size* ln(1+ weeks after the merger)) is also included in the regression.
Finally, as suggested by the linked oligopoly hypothesis, the number of markets in which a bank is active might also significantly impact its pricing behavior. In order to estimate the effect of the market extension dimension of the mergers we include the change of number of local markets (CNM) divided by the number of markets prior to the merger as a regressor. as with the CMS, we have to approximate the CNM, which we do with the ratio of the number of markets in which a bank operates in the years before and after the merger. Again, we include the cross-product of the CNM variable and the time after the merger (CNM* ln(1+ weeks after the merger)) as a regressor.
Control variables
In addition to the merger-related variables and the variables measuring the change of the fed funds rate, we include a number of control variables for the merged bank and for the local market. For individual banks, these are bank size (measured by the log of total assets), bank size squared and the share of deposits to total assets (lagged with one year in order to avoid simultaneity). For the local market, we control for market concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl index) and per capita income (in log form) for the counties in the market.
Empirical results
The results of the baseline OLS estimations of changes in checking account rates and money market deposit account rates are illustrated in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. Estimations of the "trigger" model are presented in Table 5 and 6 19 .
A comparison of the OLS and the "trigger" model results indicates that both the economic and the statistical effects of mergers are stronger when we control for the rigidity of deposit rates.
The higher statistical significance of the "trigger" estimates can be explained by the fact that the "trigger" model ignores the noise introduced by the "no change" observations. The lower economic significance of the OLS estimates is a direct effect of the censoring bias, which is present in the OLS estimation. In the following discussion we will concentrate on the unbiased "trigger" model results.
The empirical results on changes in checking account rates point to a negative impact of mergers. Whereas the pre-merger effect is insignificant in all checking account rate regression specifications, the immediate effect of the merger is negative and statistically significant.
Moreover, the merger continues to exert a negative impact on deposit rates up until the beginning of the third year after the merger. Only during the third year can we identify a positive impact of the merger on deposit rate changes, but this impact is offset by the negative effect during the following years. All in all, mergers negatively and statistically significantly affect deposit rate adjustments. One potential explanation for the positive effect around the third year is the fact that during most of our sample period stakeholders have assumed that the "gestation" period needed to restructure a merged bank is three years (Berger et al, 1998, and Calomiris and Karceski, 2000) . Following this assumption, some window dressing around the third year might have taken place.
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Among the merger features only the change in market share (CMS) has both a statistically and an economically significant impact. Substantial in-market mergers have stronger negative effect on checking account rates in the affected market. This negative effect does, as expected, decrease with time after the merger. This result is consistent with Hannan and Prager's (1998) results, which also document a negative impact of substantial in-market mergers on deposit rates. The effect of target size is statistically insignificant. The effect of the change of the number of markets (CNM) is negative but only marginally significant statistically. We therefore find limited support for the linked oligopoly hypothesis that the expansion of the geographical scope negatively affects checking account rates (once bank size has been controlled for).
The statistically insignificant coefficients of the merger2 and merger3 variables indicate that earlier mergers do not have a significant impact on checking account rates. The change of the fed funds rate during the current month also has no significant impact on the change in checking account rates. The change in checking account rates is determined instead by changes in the fed funds rate in the previous two months. These results show that checking account rates adjust to fed fund rate changes with a substantial delay. The coefficients of the change in fed funds rate variables also suggest that the pass-through is incomplete 21 .
Bank size enters the checking account rate regressions with negative significant coefficients, indicating that larger banks tend to offer lower deposit rates. This result is consistent with results of previous studies (Park and Pennacchi, forthcoming) . The ratio of deposits to total assets has a significant positive impact on checking account rates: a bank whose primary source of financing is retail deposits will be more likely to increase its deposit rates. Market share and the average income of the local market's population are not significant, but the local market concentration (measured by the Herfindahl index) enters the regression with the expected negative, significant coefficient.
When we turn from checking account rates to money market deposit account rates, we cannot document a persistent positive or negative impact of mergers. MMDA rates significantly decrease about six months after the merger but recover again about a year after the merger.
They drop again about two years after the merger and significantly increase during the third year. In the following years, the effect is negative. We interpret this dynamic path of MMDA rate changes as a result of the post-merger integration of the pricing policies of the merging banks. It is unlikely that this pattern is caused by a systematic abuse of market power.
Among the merger features we examine, only the change in the number of markets enters the regression with a statistically significant coefficient. The sign of this coefficient is negative and points to a negative impact of geographical expansion on MMDA rates. Target's size and the change in market share have no significant impact on MMDA rates.
A comparison between the checking account and MMDA rate results shows that mergers mainly affect checking account rates. Our interpretation of this result is that because of high switching costs, monopoly rents can more easily be extracted from checking account customers. In contrast, MMDAs are an investment product with low switching costs, and MMDA customers can easily switch to a competitor if their current bank offers relatively low MMDA rates.
Moreover, the coefficients of our control variables suggest that local market characteristics are irrelevant for MMDA rates. These results suggest that competition in the MMDA market is not geographically limited to the metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Previous research has already argued that the traditional definition of a local bank market as limited to the MSA may not be valid nowadays, because telecommunication allows customers to access more distantly located banks (Edelstein and Morgan, 2006) . Our results show that MMDA rates are indeed generally decoupled from local market conditions. Checking account rates, on the contrary, still strongly depend on local market concentration and on the changes in the distribution of market shares.
Another interesting difference between MMDA and checking account rates is their dependence on bank size. Whereas larger banks tend to keep checking account rates low, are associated with more sophisticated customers, who can take advantage of the increased competition offered in larger geographical markets.
Conclusion
This research project is motivated by the contradictory results of previous studies that have examined the impact of mergers on deposit rates. By replicating previous studies on our new comprehensive deposit rate dataset, we are able to show that empirical results are very sensitive to the treatment of the time span around a merger and the choice of control variables.
This observation encourages us to revisit the topic of deposit rate dynamics around bank mergers. For this purpose, we employ deposit rate data with monthly frequency. The high frequency data allows a better treatment of the deposit rate dynamics. However, it makes an estimation methodology which can account for the rigidity of deposit rates necessary.
When accounting for deposit rate rigidity, we are able to document a significant negative impact of mergers on checking account rates. In particular, in-market mergers, which substantially increase the market share of the merging bank, tend to cause a substantial drop in checking account rates. On the other hand, MMDA rates are not consistently affected after bank mergers. Moreover, once we control for bank size, we cannot document a negative impact of out-of-market mergers on deposit rates. Our results are consistent with results of earlier studies, which find support for the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis Hannan, 1989, and Prager, 1998) . Our findings do, however, contradict Focarelli and Panetta's (2003) results, since we are not able to find any positive long-term effects of the mergers on both types of deposit rates.
A major contribution of our analysis is that we demonstrate the importance of deposit rate dynamics. A more comprehensive analysis of the time series structure of deposit rates and their reaction to reference rate changes is a scheduled extension of this research project.
